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China’s Efforts and the Development of 






The Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue achieved 
significant progress in 2007 with the issuance of two joint agreements on 
the concrete steps towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
Largely thanks to China’s strenuous efforts, the talks in 2007 were marked 
by clear objectives, a strong sense of time, direct emphases and high 
feasibility. Sharing important stakes on the issue, China has played an 
ever active role in promoting the communication and negotiation among 
all parties, which is widely acknowledged by the international society. 
 
 
With joint efforts from all parties, the Six-Party talks concerning 
North Korea’s nuclear issue achieved significant progress in 2007. A 
realistic roadmap for North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea) to abandon its nuclear programme has begun to take shape. 
According to the two joint statements issued by all the six parties on the 
concrete steps toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North 
Korea was to shut down and seal the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including 
the reprocessing facility, as well as accurately and completely report its 
nuclear program by 31 December 2007. Despite the procrastination 
towards the end of the year, the situation on the Peninsula tends to be 
stable and peaceful, as both the United States (U.S.) and North Korea are 
dedicated to improving their bilateral relations. 
“China has insisted on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 
thus it has played an active role in promoting communication and 
negotiation among all parties. Not only did China host three plenary 
meetings of the Six-Party Talks [in 2007], but it is also a major force 
                                                        
* Dr Gong Keyu is Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Department of Asia-Pacific Studies & 
Center of Woman Studies, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Shanghai, China. This 
is a revised version of the paper presented at the Workshop on “The Koreas at Sixty: 
Retrospect and Prospect”, hosted by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, 
8 May 2008. 
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behind the passing of the two important joint statements that mark 
substantial advancement in the denuclearization process of the Peninsula. 
Generally speaking, China has served as a very successful moderator in 
the formation of the peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula as well as 
the security mechanism of Northeast Asia.”1 This irreplaceable role is 
increasingly acknowledged by international society. 
 
I. New Advancement in the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
 
The missile and nuclear tests of North Korea and the subsequent 
United Nations (UN) Resolution 1718 in October 2006 greatly worsened 
the US-North Korea relationship and the security situation on the 
Peninsula. Thanks to the mediation of China, the Six-Party Talks 
reconvened shortly after the informal meeting of the heads of delegations 
of China, the United States and North Korea on 31 October 2006. From 18 
to 22 December, the second phase of the fifth round of the talks were held 
in Beijing.2 
In 2007, with the joint efforts of the international society, the 
Six-Party Talks achieved significant advancement: concrete measures and 
actions became focal topics of the talks, to replace the old ones on 
principles and standpoints. 
The heads of delegations from the United States and North Korea met 
in Berlin in mid-January and reached “something of an agreement” on 
reconvening the Six-Party Talks. Such bilateral meetings were considered 
“quite beneficial” by both sides.3 At the end of the month, negotiations on 
the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue were held between Daniel Glaser, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of US Treasury, and North Korean delegates in 
Beijing, which suggested that “both the U.S. and North Korea began to 
take a more flexible stand.”4 
In an accommodating atmosphere generated by frequent contact 
between the United States and North Korea, the third phase of the fifth 
                                                        
1 Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi in “People’s Daily” interview in the end of 2007, 
People’s Daily, 24 December 2007. 
2 Yu Shaohua, “The North Korean Nuclear Issue’s Room and Prospects for the Six-Party 
Talks”, International Studies No. 3, 2007, p.52. 
3 Xinhua News Agency from Seoul, January 19, 2007. 
4 China News Service, Beijing, 7 February, 2007, According to interview with Tao Wenzhao, 
the Institute of American Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Banco Delta Asia 
was a bank in Macau, which was accused of illegal utilizing funds on North Korea’s behalf. 
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round of the Six-Party Talks began on 8 February, focusing on the 
measures to be taken by the six parties as the initial steps to implementing 
the September 19 Joint Statement. “All the six parties reiterated that the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is their common objective and 
that they will endeavor to fulfill their commitment as stated in the Joint 
Statement. They assented to implement the Joint Statement by taking 
concerted measures based on an ‘action-to-action’ principle.” 5  After 
nearly 100 bilateral and multilateral meetings over six days, the third 
phase of the fifth round witnessed the issuance of a document to 
implement the Joint Statement on the initial steps toward the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which a timetable is set for 
the six parties to act respectively, and five working groups—on the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of North 
Korea-U.S. relations, normalization of North Korea-Japan relations, 
economic and energy cooperation, as well as a joint Northeast Asia peace 
and security mechanism. Beyond many people’s expectations, the 
February 13 Agreement finally came to so many specific and feasible 
agreements that it has been applauded as a new “milestone” on the road to 
the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.6 
Within a month, each of the five working groups held its first meeting 
as scheduled. Besides, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), paid an invited two-day visit 
to North Korea to discuss details about the sealing of the Yongbyon 
nuclear facility. 
A new round of talks started on 19 March after the shortest interval 
from the previous round since the mechanism took effect. In the first phase, 
all parties reviewed the reports submitted by the five working groups and 
discussed further steps to implement the Joint Resolution; they also agreed 
to proceed with the Six-Party Talks and reiterated their determination and 
commitment. Because a resolution to the BDA issue had not been reached, 
the six parties decided on a temporary adjournment on 22 March, but they 
expected to reconvene as soon as possible for making concrete plans for 
next steps.7 Later, since North Korea insisted in fulfilling its commitment 
                                                        
5 Bill Powell, “North Korea Has Agreed To Shut Down Its Nuclear Program. Is He Really 
Ready to Disarm?” Time, 26 February 2007. 
6 Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 13 February 2007. 
7 Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 22 March 2007. 
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only after the BDA funds had been freed, the original schedule to close the 
Yongbyon nuclear facility before 14 April was postponed. 
With the efforts of such countries as Russia and China, the BDA issue 
was finally resolved, and the Six-Party Talks were able to proceed.8 On 
July 18-19, the sixth round of talks among heads of the delegations was 
held, and the six parties reached four basic agreements: 1) all parties will 
reiterate their determination to fulfill their commitment; 2) North Korea is 
to completely report its nuclear programme and demolish all nuclear 
facilities as promised; 3) North Korea will be provided with an amount of 
economic, energy, and humanitarian aid equal to 950, 000 tons of heavy 
oil; and 4) all parties agree to fulfill their respective duty according to the 
“action-to-action” principle.9 
From September 27 to 30, the second phase of the sixth round 
focused on the formation of plans to implement the second steps of the 
Joint Resolution. As the joint document needs to be approved by relevant 
governments, the Talks adjourned for three days. When the delegates 
reconvened, they passed a second Joint Resolution on implementing the 
second steps towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, according 
to which “North Korea is to defunctionalize the 5MW(e) reactor, the 
processing factory (reactive chemical laboratory), and the nuclear fuel 
parts factory in Yongbyon, as well as completely and accurately report its 
nuclear program before December 31, 2007, as stipulated in the February 
13 Agreement; North Korea shall reiterate its commitment not to transfer 
any nuclear materials, technology or relevant data. On that basis the U.S. 
and North Korea will agree to take measures to improve their bilateral 
relations towards the establishment of overall diplomatic relations between 
the two countries.”10 
As compensation, 450,000 tons of heavy oil as well as energy 
equipment and other materials equivalent to 500,000 tons of heavy oil 
shall be provided to North Korea by China, the United States, South Korea 
(Republic of Korea) and Russia. Yet, only 150,000 tons of heavy oil 
altogether were provided to North Korea by the end of 2007 by three 
countries— South Korea in late July, China in late September and the 
                                                        
8 Bill Powell, “North Korea Comes Back to the Table”, Time, 27 June 2007. 
9 [Singapore], Zaobao 21 July 2007. 
10 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Says U.S. Will Lift Sanctions”, New York Times, 4 October 
2007. 
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United States in late October, respectively11—while Russia failed to 
perform its part to provide 50,000 tons in November. Moreover, South 
Korea was “the only country that provided 5,010 tons of steel to North 
Korea on December 16 as economic aid.”12 
Towards the end of 2007, the United States kept urging North Korea 
to report its nuclear programme as scheduled, only to meet with North 
Korea’s postponement because of “insufficient compensation.” As a North 
Korean official said on 26 December, “Because other countries in the 
Six-Party Talks deferred their duty to compensate North Korea 
economically, we have no other choice but to adjust our steps towards 
denuclearization accordingly.”13 In contrast, the United States insisted that 
“North Korea completely and accurately report and disclose all its nuclear 
facilities, details of its nuclear program and related actions, as well as 
finish denuclearization as required in the agreement.”14 That indicates the 
Bush Administration would rather see North Korea postpone its nuclear 
report than accept a deficient one. Thus the United States and North Korea 
reached a deadlock once again on the uranium enrichment programme 
(UEP) report issue,15 which resulted in North Korea’s failure to meet the 
goal of fully reporting its nuclear programme before 31 December 2007, 
and in postponing a new round of talks to 2008. 
 
II. Features of the Six-Party Talks in 2007 
 
The Six-Party Talks (six rounds, or eleven phases, altogether) have 
lasted five years intermittently since August 2003. So far, many important 
documents including the Chairman’s Statement and a number of joint 
documents have been produced, playing a key role in resolving North 
Korea’s nuclear issue. Especially during 2007, the talks touched upon the 
central, yet most complicated, issues of North Korea’s denuclearization 
process and U.S.-North Korean normalization, as well as agreeing two 
documents on implementing the Joint Statement, which paved the way 
                                                        
11 Peter Baker, “U.S. to Ship Oil To North Korea: Bush Cites Progress on Denuclearization”, 
Washington Post, 29 September 2007. 
12 [ROK] Chosun Ilbo, December 26, 2007. 
13 China Daily, December 27, 2007. 
14 Press Statement, Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman, Washington DC, December 30, 2007. 
15 The United States agreed to use the word “uranium enrichment program” (UEP) instead of 
“high-enriched uranium program” (HEU). 
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towards a peaceful resolution of the issue. In general, the Six-Party Talks 
in 2007 had the following four features:  
 
1. Clear Objectives 
 
2007 was an important year for the Six-Party Talks and the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Six-Party Talks not only 
contribute to peace and stability of Northeast Asia as well as the 
development and good relationship of relevant countries, but they are also 
helpful to construct a new harmonious Northeast Asia. “The talks once 
again prove that more negotiation and communication are very hopeful for 
further achievements.”16 
The original goal of the Six-Party Talks was denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula, yet an argument arose about whether the talks were 
bound to be fruitless given North Korea’s nuclear test. As a matter of fact, 
“the Six-Party Talks are still the best way to resolve North Korea’s nuclear 
issue, whose significance cannot be diminished by North Korea’s nuclear 
test.”17 
A major task of the talks before the final goal is achieved is to tackle 
the nuclear crisis as well as the subsequent conflicts among relevant 
countries. In other words, the Six-Party Talks serve “1) to avoid loss of 
control of the situation and the upgrade of conflicts between North Korea 
and the U.S. or between North Korea and the U.N.; 2) to preclude North 
Korea from conducting a second nuclear test; 3) to prevent proliferation; 
and 4) to avoid a race of nuclear buildup in Northeast Asia.”18 
“With respect to North Korea, a self-claimed nuclear power, an ideal 
platform such as the Six-Party Talks is especially necessary for dialogue, 
communication and negotiation among related parties, as well as for 
dissolving regional conflicts and preventing proliferation. As the talks are 
irreplaceable in settling North Korea’s nuclear issue, the mechanism 
should be sustained without doubt.”19 
                                                        
16 Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 13 February 2007. 
17 Shi Yuanhua, “The North Korean nuclear test and re-open the six-party talks”, Northeast 
Asia Forum, January, No. 1, 2007, p.53. 
18 Li Dunqiu, “North Korea and the United States, how to talk about outside the six-party 
talks”, World Knowledge No. 4, 2007, p.31. 
19 Shi Yuanhua, “The North Korean nuclear test and re-open the six-party talks”, Northeast 
Asia Forum, January, No. 1, 2007, p.54. 
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From this perspective, the Six-Party Talks have played, and will 
continue to play, a key role in the final settlement of the issue. 
 
2. Strong Sense of Time 
 
The two documents concerning the initial and following steps to 
implement the Joint Statement both set very clear timetables. For example, 
“The initial actions shall be taken in the following 60 days,” “all the 
working groups are to function in 30 days,” “North Korea is to completely 
and accurately report its nuclear program by December 31, 2007,” etc. 
Herein can be seen a strong emphasis on “deadlines.” Indeed, during the 
five years since the talks began, a number of documents and statements 
were issued, only to disappoint many people time and time again. Besides, 
as the mechanism is not yet institutionalized, either North Korea or the 
United States might refuse to join the talks with certain excuses and so the 
mechanism has to be ‘paused’. As a result, North Korea had earned 
enough time to carry out its nuclear test while the marathon-like talks went 
on and on with little, if any, effect, and the denuclearization process was 
seriously hindered. 
The delay and postponement of agreements mainly derives from a 
commonly-shared view of related parties “to keep patient and progress 
slowly,” or “even to take the talks as the final objective, instead of a means 
to achieve denuclearization of the Peninsula.” However, “facts warn 
people of the necessity to prevent North Korea from further developing its 
nuclear power as well as to avoid the possible proliferation in Northeast 
Asia within a limited period of time. The change in attitude is the most 
important reason for the actual progress of the Six-Party Talks (in 
2007).”20 
Having learnt lessons from the past, the Six-Party Talks have put 
more emphasis on the deadlines of scheduled actions and consider this the 
key to the resolution of the issue, which is not only illustrated in the joint 
documents, but is shown in the dedicated actions of related parties. 
 
                                                        
20 Zhang Liangui, “The six-party talks: a new start, the new test”, World Knowledge No. 5, 
2007, p.31. 
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3. Direct Emphases 
 
As a segment of the Six-Party Talks, the five working groups have 
not yet attained synchronized progress, yet they are very helpful to the 
development of the talks. Now that the five groups are responsible for 
different fields, an issue can be first brought to a group for discussion and 
negotiation, and then submitted onto the table of the Six-Party Talks, 
which, by its direct emphasis on specific issues, greatly enhances the 
effectiveness of the mechanism. 
As a new means designed for the Six-Party Talks, the working groups 
can target and resolve specific issues with much clearer aims, thus North 
Korea does not have to face the other sides and all the problems at the 
same time, which makes the maximization of the self-interests of all the 
related parties more possible. In short, the working groups have begun to 
prove to be a better way to achieve normalization between North Korea 
and other countries as well as the establishment of a security mechanism in 
Northeast Asia on the basis of communication and negotiation. 
For the Working Group on Normalization between North Korea and 
the United States talks were held “in a constructive and sincere 
atmosphere” between Kim Gye Gwan, head of the North Korean 
delegation, and Christopher Hill, head of the US counterpart; the first time 
between the two countries on such a topic, which suggests “the thick ice 
between them is beginning to thaw.”21 Meanwhile, negotiations between 
North Korea and Japan on normalization have also started “on the basis of 
a prudent reexamination of history and the satisfactory settlement of 
relevant disputes according to the Pyongyang Declaration.” Despite the 
lack of progress, the two countries have indeed deepened their mutual 
understanding, which lays a good foundation for further development of 
their bilateral relations. Meanwhile, the Working Group on Economic and 
Energy Cooperation held three talks on specific plans concerning heavy oil 
aid to North Korea and North Korea’s denuclearization process. Likewise, 
the Working Groups on Denuclearization and on Security Mechanism of 
the Korean Peninsula also drafted a number of specific plans for action. 
 
                                                        
21 Wang Yan, “Nuclear talks: North Korea step by step”, China News Weekly, March 26, 
2007, p.34. 
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4. High Feasibility 
 
Through the joint efforts of all parties, the documents on 
implementing the initial and second steps of the Joint Statement managed 
to clarify the rights, duty and tasks for each party, which serves as a good 
beginning for denuclearization of the Peninsula. 
Mohamed ElBaradei’s visit to North Korea on 13 March was the first 
since IAEA officials were expelled from North Korea after the nuclear 
crisis began in 2002. From June 26 to 30, Olli Heinonen, the IAEA's 
deputy director general, and three other IAEA officials examined the 
nuclear facilities at five places, and reached consensus with North Korea 
on the verification procedure of closing and sealing the nuclear facilities in 
Yongbyon. On 14 July, North Korea formally closed the Yongbyon facility 
and opened the site for IAEA officials’ inspection. On 5 November, a 
nine-specialist team headed by Sung Kim, Director of the Korean Affairs 
Office in the US State Department, arrived in Yongbyon to begin 
defunctionalizing the nuclear facilities.22 On 27 November, an inspection 
group consisting of ten officials and specialists from China, South Korea, 
Japan, Russia and the United States also landed in Pyongyang to supervise 
the defunctionalization of the facilities.23 
Up to now, many tasks mentioned during the Six-Party Talks have 
been completed one after another - North Korea has closed and sealed the 
Yongbyon nuclear and processing facility, IAEA officials were invited to 
return to North Korea, and the 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon has begun its 
defunctionalization process, etc. - basically according to such principles as 
“all necessary inspection or verification is to be encouraged with consent 
from both IAEA and North Korea” and that “measures proposed by the 
specialist teams shall be approved by the heads of delegations by 
international standards for soundness, security and verifiability.” These 
measures and principles clearly indicate the feasibility of the documents 
produced in the Six-Party Talks. 
Except for the goal of North Korea’s “completely and accurately 
reporting its nuclear program by December 31, 2007,” all the objectives of 
the joint documents have been reached, and the Six-Party Talks are 
                                                        
22 Jae-Soon Chang, US: N. Korea Cooperating to Disable Nukes, The Washington Post, 6 
November 2007. 
23 People’s Daily, Pyongyang, 27 November 2007. 
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expected to play an even more important role in the denuclearization of the 
Peninsula. 
 
III. China’s National Interests on the Korean Peninsula 
 
China has been an active advocate for peace, development and 
cooperation since the New Millennium began. By sticking to the road of 
peaceful development, it endeavors to develop itself by maintaining peace 
of the world and, in turn, to promote peace of the world by developing 
itself. Its “Good-Neighborliness-and-Friendly-Cooperation” foreign policy 
not only helps create a favorable environment for China’s reform and 
modernization, but it is also vital to a harmonious neighborhood of lasting 
peace and common prosperity. With the increase of China’s national power 
and its influence over regional affairs, China is playing an ever more 
important part in molding a security environment of its neighborhood that 
is beneficial to peace and prosperity of the whole region.24 
In terms of North Korea’s nuclear issue, China’s standpoint has 
always been clear and consistent, i.e., “to maintain denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula and to preserve peace and stability of the Peninsula 
through the dialogue mechanism.” “To maintain denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula” is the objective of China’s policy on North Korea’s 
nuclear issue; “through the dialogue mechanism” is the best way to the 
objective; and “to preserve peace and stability of the Peninsula” is a 
natural result after the objective is achieved. Therefore, this statement has 
a clear logic and profound significance, no part of which can be omitted or 
put in a different order.25 
 
Specifically, China’s national interests include: 
 
1. Peace and Stability of the Region 
 
The general objective of China’s foreign policy is to promote “a 
harmonious Asia” and “a harmonious world,” which is an extension of 
China’s “harmonious society” principle and marks a new phase for China’s 
                                                        
24 Xu Jian, “The International Situation and China’s Diplomacy”, International Studies, No. 
2, 2007, p.15. 
25 Zhang Liangui, “The situation after North Korea’s nuclear test and China’s choice”, New 
Vision No. 2, 2007, p.26. 
 11
diplomacy. Harmonious foreign policy, derived from China’s culture, 
confidence, power and ambition, is comprised of a brand-new global value, 
indicating that China expects to shoulder a heavier duty to maintain world 
peace and promote common development. This policy suggests that China 
acknowledges and takes an active part in the current international system, 
and that it is willing to realize its own interests and seek common interests 
within the existing international order. Besides, it advocates a new style of 
behavior that is conducive to the friendly coexistence and common benefit 
of all countries of the world.26 
A harmonious neighborhood is the primary goal of constructing a 
harmonious world and the foundation of a domestic harmonious society. 
Thus China’s Friendly-neighborhood policy helps reach its strategic goal 
on the regional level.27 
Bordering China, the Korean peninsula’s geopolitical position, its 
history and current status have been closely related to China’s political, 
military and economic security. Should the nuclear crisis give rise to a 
large-scale riot or even a war, the international environment that China 
faces would deteriorate seriously and social stability and economic 
development in Northeast China would also be greatly impaired. Therefore, 
it is of vital importance to China’s strategic interests to lower the 
possibility of the crisis escalating into a war, to help pull the peninsula out 
of a Cold War status, and to prevent, or at least postpone, the occurrence of 
acute conflicts on the peninsula. To maintain peace and stability on the 
peninsula, however, does not mean to maintain the separated situation. On 
the contrary, China is playing an active role in breaking the impasse 
between the United States and North Korea, helping with a soft landing of 
North Korea’s economy, and promoting the peaceful reunification of the 
peninsula, which is not only in China’s interest, but will satisfy the 
common interest of all parties to the greatest extent. 
 
2. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 
 
The nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula is a heritage of the Cold 
War era, which should be resolved as the peninsula steps out of its Cold 
                                                        
26 Yu Zhengliang, Que Tianshu, “China’s New Diplomatic: Concept and Practice”, Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theory, No. 5, 2007, p.15. 
27 Shen Guofang, “China’s New Diplomatic: Concept and Practice”, World Knowledge, No. 
13, 2007, p.44. 
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War status. The tension and the Cold War status on the peninsula will 
never be eliminated until North Korea gives up its nuclear programme. 
Paradoxically, as long as North Korea still faces heavy pressure on its 
strategic environment or feels threatened by the United States and some 
other countries, it will stick to the goal of developing its own nuclear 
weapons, regardless of the objective of “denuclearization” announced in 
the September 19 Joint Statement. The nuclear programme has always 
been used by North Korea as leverage against the United States. Once its 
security is guaranteed by a non-invasion promise by the United States and 
the beginning of the normalization process, it can be predicted that North 
Korea will happily give up its nuclear programme and begin to be engaged 
in international society. Therefore, boosting denuclearization without first 
ensuring the peace and stability of the peninsula, or insisting in reaching 
the goal by force, will prove detrimental to the final resolution. 
The Chinese government has always held that North Korea should 
not conduct nuclear tests, but its sharp and grave attitude, as well as 
prompt reaction, towards North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 is a first in the 
history of China-North Korea relations. This is because: 1) North Korea’s 
nuclear test further complicates the issue and provides a good excuse for 
the ‘hawks’ in the United States to apply to force, which poses a serious 
threat to the security of Northeast Asia; 2) the test may lead to nuclear 
pollution and “a high tide of refugees,” thus menacing the peace and 
development of Chinese Northeastern provinces; 3) the test may bring 
about a domino effect of a nuclear buildup in neighbouring countries, 
which will harm the peaceful environment for China, Northeast Asia, and 
even the whole Asia-Pacific region; and 4) the test might render all the 
efforts through the Six-Party Talks useless and generate an uncontrollable 
situation. 
 
3. Easing Tension on the Korean Peninsula  
 
“Détente, peace and reunification” has become a common hope for 
the people of both the North and the South on the Korea Peninsula. The 
leaders of both countries are also adjusting their policy according to the 
changing situation, trying to enhance peace and stability on the Peninsula. 
However, due to the lasting mutual distrust and huge differences between 
the two in their social systems, ideologies, economic systems and values, a 
breakthrough in their political relationship is barely visible in the short 
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term. A resolution of North Korea’s nuclear issue and the following 
establishment of a peace mechanism, therefore, will be able to end the 
precarious situation of “no war, no peace and no negotiation” by gradually 
increasing their mutual understanding and trust. 
China has been supporting the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. 
As a close neighbour to the peninsula, China does not only expect to 
maintain friendship with North Korea, but is looking forward to 
developing a cooperative relationship with South Korea both on the 
political level and in other fields. China does not seek a leading position, 
scope of influence, or self-interest on the peninsula. Actually, the Chinese 
government and the leadership have repeatedly declared that China 
supports the two sides on the peninsula advancing towards détente, and 
then a peaceful reunification, on the condition that no foreign forces get 
involved.28 
 
4. Development of Mutual Trust and Benefit and the Bilateral Relations 
with the United States 
 
US-China relations are among the most important and complicated 
bilateral relations in the world today. After 9/11, anti-terrorism and the 
prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became two 
major strategic goals of the United States, while China’s active 
cooperation with the United States in these fields strongly pushes forward 
the development of the bilateral relations as well as their cooperation on 
global and regional issues, now that they share many common interests in 
maintaining national security and the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. 
North Korea’s nuclear issue provides a good opportunity for China 
and the United States to improve their mutual acknowledgment and trust, 
as well as to promote the overall development of their bilateral relations, 
despite the fact that they share both common interests and significant 
dissension. From the perspective of the general environment for China’s 
diplomacy, especially for the long-term dynamics between China and the 
United States, the Korean Peninsula might well serve as an effective 
platform for China to balance the influence of the United States while 
strengthening their cooperation on the global level. Taking an active role in 
                                                        
28 Li Dunqiu, “The Development of Relations between China and ROK in Northeast after the 
Cold War”, Contemporary ROK, Summer, 2007, p.7. 
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diffusing the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, China is not only able 
to contain US expansion more effectively, but it will also help maintain 
and develop the US-China strategic relationship. 
 
5. A Mutual Trust Mechanism for Regional Development 
 
The Asia-Pacific region witnesses the dynamics of big powers and 
delicate intermingled national interests. Since the end of the Cold War, big 
powers in the region keep adjusting their foreign policies to the 
ever-changing situation and seek to exert more influence over the region. 
The relative peaceful status of the region at present does not only depend 
on the general trend of the world development, but also on the interest and 
power structure of the four big countries, namely, China, Russia, Japan and 
the United States. However, the crisis over nuclear proliferation is 
speeding up policy adjustment of these countries, which may lead to the 
collapse of the relative balance of power in the region. 
The lack of mutual trust is a major cause for the security dilemma in 
Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, there exists great potential for the 
establishment of a mutual trust mechanism in the region, as all countries 
share the same security interests and the need for economic development. 
In the past, the different characteristics of national interests of individual 
countries were the topic of concern in analyzing the causes for the lack of 
mutual trust, yet in this globalization era, the common features of different 
countries’ national interests have become increasingly conspicuous. 
Undoubtedly, to maximize national interests is the guiding principle in 
formulating a country’s foreign policy. Therefore, international society and 
all countries in Northeast Asia can work together to establish a mutual 
trust mechanism by expanding and developing their common interests, on 
which basis their separate national interests can be better achieved.29 
 
IV. China’s Role in the Six-Party Talks 
 
China’s constructive role in resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue is 
widely acknowledged in the world. It can be said that, without China, the 
Six-Party Talks would never be possible, let alone the progress that has 
                                                        
29 Li Shuyun, CK Lau, “Trust: The Key Factor of the Security Cooperation in Northeast 
Asia”, Diplomatic Comment, February 2007, p.82. 
 15
been achieved so far. In general, China’s contribution to the talks is shown 
through the following four aspects: 
 
1. Facilitating the Talks as a Warm Host  
 
China has paid enduring efforts during the talks and proves to be a 
very warm host and successful moderator. “At the critical moment, the 
talks lasted from the previous morning till early next day. China not only 
created a platform for negotiation, but it also served as an active mediator 
among related parties. When it looked ‘hopeless,’ China could still find a 
breakthrough to improve the atmosphere and reach an agreement. As the 
host country for the talks, China is one of the keys to the final issuance of 
the joint documents. In this sense, we can say that the Chinese diplomacy 
scored quite some points.”30 
Both the Joint Statement and the following joint documents were 
reached on the basis of China’s proposals, because they were flexible and 
designed to balance all parties’ interests. In view of the intricacy and 
sensitiveness of the nuclear issue, China has been trying its best to create a 
rather friendly atmosphere for negotiation among all parties, thus greatly 
enhancing their trust in each other. “Although China’s national power is 
increasing, it has never before played such a leading role as a moderator in 
multilateral diplomacy.”31 Its efforts are not only instrumental to the 
resolution of North Korea’s nuclear issue, but also prove that China has 
become the most important country in promoting the establishment and 
development of the peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. 
 
2. Coordinating among All Parties as a Patient Moderator 
 
China is the initiator and promoter of the Six-Party Talks. “With an 
objective, overall and balanced attitude, China endeavors to take all 
parties’ interests into consideration. As China is always open to 
communication and negotiation with the other five parties, its travail is 
surely helpful to the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and 
to peace and stability of Northeast Asia.”32 “China tries its best to support 
and promote the Six-Party Talks, as well as to encourage all parties to seek 
                                                        
30 Xinhua News Agency February 14, 2007. 
31 Xinhua News Agency, September 19, 2005. 
32 China Daily Online, December 17, 2006. 
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more common interests. Besides, it has taken a lot of measures to fulfill its 
promises in a balanced way, by which to increase mutual trust among all 
parties. It also takes efforts to make some new achievements for each 
meeting or talk. This peaceful means through negotiation and dialogue will 
prove to be the best way to more consensuses and the final solution.”33 
From shuttle diplomacy to mutual visits of the leadership, from 
sending special envoys to meetings between heads of delegations, China 
has played the role of a patient moderator among all parties, encouraging 
each of them to reach the goal of denuclearization step by step and by 
peaceful means. Furthermore, China has paid due concern over North 
Korea’s political and economic requests, and advocated joint engagement 
of the other five parties in compensating North Korea. 
 
3. Mediating between the U.S. and North Korea as a Skillful Balancer 
 
In the eyes of Japan, South and the United States, among others, 
China maintains a special relationship with North Korea - from “brotherly 
friendship” in the past to Kim Jong-il’s many informal visits to China in 
recent years.  
The volume of bilateral trade between China and North Korea 
reached US$ 1.7 billion (around 12.92 billion RMB) in 2006, almost half 
of the total foreign trade volume of North Korea. Moreover, 80 to 90% of 
North Korea’s daily commodity imports are from China. After North 
Korea’s nuclear test, the grave statement of the Chinese government and 
the following action (overall suspension of investment into North Korea34) 
became a key to reopening the Six-Party Talks, “because North Korea 
takes China’s stand seriously. The U.S. has to cooperate with China in 
pushing North Korea away from its nuclear program. In a word, China’s 
influence over North Korea is irreplaceable.”35 Indeed, “China enjoys the 
greatest leverage to move North Korea, that is, China provides the most 
support to the country, and is its largest trading partner as well. Yet China 
does not boast the leverage, but use it tactfully in pressuring upon North 
Korea when necessary.”36  
                                                        
33 Yu Zhengliang, Que Tianshu, “China’s New Diplomatic: Concept and Practice”, Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theory, No. 5, 2007, p.15. 
34 Yonhapnews Agency, Seoul, 2 February 2007. 
35 Xinhua News Agency, 12 October 2006. 
36 Chosun Ilbo 12 October 2006. 
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On the one hand, China firmly disapproves of North Korea 
conducting the nuclear test while remaining cautious in levying sanctions 
upon it; yet, on the other hand, China is trying its best to convince the 
United States not to upgrade the conflicts and crisis. This dual-purpose 
strategy serves as a guarantee for the peaceful resolution of North Korea’s 
nuclear issue, and renders China much influence over the issue as well as 
receiving wide acknowledgement from the world. 
 
4. Promoting the Talks as a Wise and Flexible Participant 
 
Many details demonstrate China’s wisdom and flexibility during the 
Six-Party Talks. For example, to enhance contact and communication 
between delegates from North Korea and the United States, China 
arranged their seats by the order of the full names of their respective 
countries, so that heads of both delegations could be seated next to each 
other; 37 the interpretation system was made to synchronize with the 
flashing of five bulbs, which would be lit once simultaneous interpretation 
began, and would be turned off when interpreters finished in all five 
languages. Besides, officials of China’s Foreign Ministry often responded 
to a question with vivid similes, such as “wishing the talks as sweet as 
Coca-Cola,” “we have mounted many peaks, and caught many big fish,”38 
“all the six parties are on the same boat that has departed from the port; 
now that no one can get off, all we can do is unite together and sail 
forward.”39 These humorous but sincere remarks not only represented a 
new image of Chinese diplomats, but also greatly helped to ease the 
tension among all parties at the beginning of the talks. 
With regard to the fact that the Six-Party Talks and the bilateral 
negotiation between North Korea and the United States were often held at 
the same time, China’s position was that “results are more important than 
means,” as it is certain that the bilateral talks between the United States 
and North Korea - whether in New York or in Berlin - have to be finalized 
with a statement or other documents within the framework of the Six-Party 
Talks in Beijing. For instance, the US-North Korea meeting in Berlin is 
                                                        
37 Accordingly this means North Korea is DPRK (D), Japan is Japan (J), China is PRChina 
(P), South Korea is ROK (Ro), Russia is Russia (Ru), the United States is the USA (U), So 
the United States and North Korea can sit nearby each other. 
38 China News Service, 29 September 2007. 
39 China News Service, Beijing, 22 March 2007. 
 18
still “an integral part of the Six-Party Talks, a kind of bilateral contact 
during the interim.”40  
As to the other five parties apart from North Korea, patience is 
especially needed for better atmosphere for the bilateral negotiation 
between the United States and North Korea within the framework of the 
Six-Party Talks. All related parties should make full use of their own 
advantages and influence and play their bargaining chips wisely, so as to 
prevent the crisis from escalating into a whole-scale war on the Peninsula. 
In the process, China, South Korea and the United States are to cooperate 
closely and coordinate their separate interests and policies. Despite its 
limited influence over North Korea, China should actively work with other 
parties to implement UN resolutions and put pressure on both North Korea 
and the United States, in order to push forward the Six-Party Talks with its 
political and economic power as well as its impartiality.41 
Action is the key to the final resolution of the issue. It will remain a 
massive “systematic project” to implement the Joint Statement, the joint 
documents, energy aid such as heavy oil, “fully reporting North Korea’s 
nuclear program,” “defunctionalizing all its nuclear facilities,” and the 
future impact of the five working groups.42 
There is still a long way to go before our final goal is reached. But we 
are confident that China’s strenuous efforts will help generate further 
progress towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear issue. As Tang 
Jiaxuan, China’s State Councilor, said, the Six-Party Talks entail “further 
efforts - political will and wisdom, flexibility and patience - from all 
related parties, who must stick to the road of resolving the issue through 
dialogue and remain loyal to their commitment, so as to push forward the 
Six-Party Talks towards even better results. The Chinese government fully 
supports the documents reached on the talks and will be always ready to 
undertake its duty.” 
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